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Abstract
In approachability with full monitoring there are two types of conditions that
are known to be equivalent for convex sets: a primal and a dual condition. The
primal one is of the form: a set C is approachable if and only all containing half-
spaces are approachable in the one-shot game. The dual condition is of the form:
a convex set C is approachable if and only if it intersects all payoff sets of a certain
form. We consider approachability in games with partial monitoring. In previous
works (Perchet, 2011a, Mannor et al., 2011) we provided a dual characterization of
approachable convex sets and we also exhibited efficient strategies in the case where
C is a polytope. In this paper we provide primal conditions on a convex set to be
approachable with partial monitoring. They depend on a modified reward function
and lead to approachability strategies based on modified payoff functions and that
proceed by projections similarly to Blackwell’s (1956) strategy. This is in contrast
with previously studied strategies in this context that relied mostly on the signaling
structure and aimed at estimating well the distributions of the signals received. Our
results generalize classical results by Kohlberg (1975) (see also Mertens et al., 1994)
and apply to games with arbitrary signaling structure as well as to arbitrary convex
sets.
1. Introduction
Approachability theory dates back to the seminal paper of Blackwell (1956). In this
paper Blackwell presented conditions under which a player can guarantee that the long-
term average vector-valued reward is asymptotically close to some target set regardless
of the opponent actions. If this property holds, we say that the set is approachable. In
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the full monitoring case studied in Blackwell (1956) there are two equivalent conditions
for a convex set to be approachable. The first one, known as a primal condition (or
later termed the “B” condition in honor for Blackwell) states that every half-space that
contains the target set is also approachable. It turns out that whether a half-space is
approachable is determined by the sign of the value of some associated zero-sum game.
The second characterization, known as the dual condition, states that for every mixed
action of the opponent, the player can guarantee that the one-shot vector-valued reward
is inside the target set.
Approachability theory has found many applications in game theory, online learning,
and related fields. Both primal and dual characterizations are of interest therein. Indeed,
checking if the dual condition holds is formally simple while a concrete approaching
strategy naturally derives from the primal condition (it only requires solving a one-shot
zero-sum game at every stage of the repeated vector-valued game).
Approachability theory has been applied to zero-sum repeated games with incomplete
information and/or imperfect (or partial) monitoring. The work of Kohlberg (1975) (see
also Mertens et al., 1994) uses approachability to derive strategies for games with in-
complete information. The general case of repeated vector-valued games with partial
monitoring was studied only recently. A dual characterization of approachable convex
sets with partial monitoring was presented by Perchet (2011a). However, it is not useful
for deriving approaching strategies since it essentially requires to run a calibration al-
gorithm, which is known to be computationally hard. In a recent work (Mannor et al.,
2011) we derived efficient strategies for approachability in games with partial monitoring
in some cases, e.g., when the convex set to be approached is a polytope. However, these
strategies are based on the dual condition, and not on any primal one: they thus do not
shed light on the structure of the game.
In this paper we provide a primal condition for approachability in games with partial
monitoring. It can be stated, as in Blackwell (1956), as a requirement that every half-
space containing the target set is one-shot approachable. However, the reward function
has to be modified in some cases for the condition to be sufficient. We also show how
it leads to an efficient approachability strategy, at least in the case of approachable
polytopes.
Outline. In Section 2 we define a model of partial monitoring and recall some of the
basic results from approachability (both in terms of its primal and dual characteriza-
tions). In Section 3 we explain the current state-of-the-art, recall the dual condition
for approachability with partial monitoring, and outline our objectives. In Section 4 we
provide results for approaching half-spaces as they have the simplest characterization of
approachability: we show that the signaling structure has no impact on approachability
of half-spaces, only the payoff structure does. This is not the case anymore for approach-
ability of more complicated convex sets, which is the focus of the subsequent sections.
In Section 5 we discuss the case of a target set that is an orthant under additional prop-
erties on the payoff–signaling structure: we show that a natural primal condition holds.
This condition, which we term the “upper-right-corner property” is the main technical
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contribution of the paper. We show that basically, we can study approachability for a
modified payoff function and that under some favorable conditions, a primal condition
is easy to derive (which is the main conceptual contribution). As an intermezzo, we link
our results to Kohlberg (1975) in Section 6 and show that repeated games with imperfect
information can be analyzed using our approach for games with imperfect monitoring.
In Section 7 we then analyze the case of a general signaling structure for the approach-
ability of orthants and provide an efficient approaching strategy based on the exhibited
primal conditions. Finally, we relax the shape of the target set from an orthant to a
polytope in Section 8, and then to a general convex set in Section 9. Our generalizations
show that the same primal condition holds in all cases. The generalization from orthants
to polytopes is based on the observation that any polytope can be represented as an or-
thant in a space whose dimensionality is the number of linear inequalities describing the
polytope and on a modified reward function. The generalization to general convex sets
uses support functions and lifting to derive similar results; we provide some background
material on support functions in the appendix.
2. Model and preliminaries
We now define the model of interest and then recall some basic results from approacha-
bility theory for repeated vector-valued games (with full monitoring).
Model and notation
We consider a vector-valued game between two players, a decision maker (or player) and
Nature, with respective finite action sets I and J , whose cardinalities are referred to
as I and J . We denote by d the dimension of the reward vector and equip Rd with the
`2–norm ‖ · ‖2. The payoff function of the player is given by a mapping r : I ×J → Rd,
which is multi-linearly extended to ∆(I) ×∆(J ), the set of product-distributions over
I × J .
At each round, the player and Nature simultaneously choose their actions in ∈ I and
jn ∈ J , at random according to probability distributions denoted by xn ∈ ∆(I) and
yn ∈ ∆(J ). At the end of a round, the player does not observe Nature’s action jn nor
even the payoff rn := r(in, jn) he obtains: he only gets to see some signal. More precisely,
there is a finite set H of possible signals, and the signal sn ∈ H that is shown to the
player is drawn at random according to the distribution H(in, jn), where the mapping
H : I × J → ∆(H) is known by both players.
The player is said to have full monitoring if H = J and H(i, j) = Full(i, j) := δj , i.e.,
if the action of Nature is observed. We speak of a game in the dark when the signaling
structure H is not informative at all, i.e., when H is reduced to a single signal referred
to as ∅; we denote this situation by H = Dark.
Of major interest will be maximal information mapping H : ∆(J )→ ∆(H)I , which
is defined as follows. The image of each j ∈ J is the vector H(j) = (H(i, j))
i∈I , and
this definition is extended linearly onto ∆(J ). An element of the image F = H(∆(J ))
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of H is referred to as a flag. The notion of “flag” is key: the player only accesses the
mixed actions y of Nature through H. Indeed, as is intuitive and as is made more formal
at the end of the proof of Proposition 2, he could at best access or estimate the flag
H(y) but not y itself.
For every x ∈ ∆(I) and h ∈ F the set of payoffs compatible with h is
m(x,h) =
{
r(x, y) : y ∈ ∆(J ) such that H(y) = h}. (1)
The set m(x,h) represents all the rewards that are statistically compatible with the
flag h (or put differently, the set of all possible rewards we cannot distinguish from).
Note that with full monitoring, H reduces to ∆(J ) and one has m(x, y) = {r(x, y)}
for all y ∈ ∆(J ).
Finally, we denote by M a uniform `2–bound on r, that is,
M = max
i,j
∥∥r(i, j)‖ .
Also, for every n ∈ N and sequence (am)m∈N, the average of the first n elements is
referred to as an = (1/n)
∑n
m=1 am. The distance to a set C is denoted by dC .
A behavioral strategy σ of the player is a mapping from the set of his finite his-
tories ∪n∈N (I ×H)n into ∆(I). Similarly, a strategy τ of nature is a mapping from
∪n∈N (I ×H × J )n into ∆(J ). As usual, we denote by Pσ,τ the probability induced by
the pair (σ, τ) onto (I ×H × J )N.
Definition and some properties of approachability
A set C ⊆ Rd is r–approachable for the signaling structure H, or, in short, is (r,H)–
approachable, if, for all ε > 0, there exists a strategy σε of the player and a natural
number N ∈ N such that, for all strategies τ of Nature,
Pσε,τ
{∃n > N s.t. dC(rn) > ε} 6 ε .
We refer to the strategy σε as an ε–approachability strategy of C. It is easy to show that
the approachability of C implies the existence of a strategy ensuring that the sequence
of the average vector-valued payoffs converges to the set C almost surely, uniformly
with respect to the strategies of Nature. By analogy such a strategy is called a 0–
approachability strategy of C.
Conversely, a set C is r–excludable for the signaling structure H if, for some δ > 0,
the complement of the δ–neighborhood of C is r–approachable by Nature for the signaling
structure H.
Primal characterization. We now discuss characterizations of approachability in the
case of full monitoring. We will need the stronger notion of one-shot approachability (the
notion of one-shot excludability is stated only for later purposes).
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Definition 1. A set C is one-shot r–approachable if there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that for
all y ∈ ∆(J ), one has r(x, y) ∈ C. A set C is one-shot r–excludable if for some δ > 0,
the complement of the δ–neighborhood of C is one-shot r–approachable by Nature.
Blackwell (1956) (see also Mertens et al., 1994) provided the following primal char-
acterization of approachable convex1 sets. A set that satisfies it is called a B–set.
Theorem 1. A convex set C is (r,Full)–approachable if and only if any containing half-
space Chs ⊇ C is one-shot r–approachable.
This characterization also leads to an approachability strategy, which we describe
with a slight modification with respect to its most classical statement. We denote by
r′t = r(xt, jt) the expected payoff obtained at round t, which is a quantity that is observed
by the player. At stage n, if r′n 6∈ C, let piC(r′n) denote the projection of r′n onto C and
consider the containing half-space Chs, n+1 whose defining hyperplane is tangent to C at
piC(r′n). The strategy then consists of choosing the mixed action xn+1 ∈ ∆(I) associated
with the one-shot approachability of Chs, n+1, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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r′n
pin
Chs, n+1
r(xn+1, j)
r(xn+1, j
′)
Figure 1: An illustration of Blackwell’s approaching strategy. At stage n + 1, when
r′n 6∈ C, the convex set C and the expected payoff r′n+1 are in the half-space Chs, n+1 while
r′n lies in its complement.
If r′n ∈ C, any choice xn+1 ∈ ∆(I) is suitable. The above strategy ensures that for
all y ∈ ∆(J ), 〈
r(xn+1, y)− piC(r′n), r′n − piC(r′n)
〉
6 0 ; (2)
which in turn ensures the convergence to C of the mixed payoffs at a rate independent
of d, namely
dC
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(xt, jt)
)
6 2M√
n
. (3)
The uniform convergence of rn to C is deduced by martingale convergence theorems (e.g.,
the Hoeffding–Azuma inequality) from the above uniform convergence of r′n to C.
1This primal characterization was actually stated by Blackwell (1956) in a more general way for all,
non-necessarily convex, sets.
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Dual characterization. In the specific case of closed convex sets, using von Neu-
mann’s min-max theorem, the primal characterization stated above can be transformed
into the following dual characterization:
C ⊆ Rd is (r,Full)–approachable ⇐⇒ ∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), ∃x ∈ ∆(I), r(x, y) ∈ C . (4)
This characterization might be simpler to formulate and to check, yet it does not provide
an explicit approachability strategy.
3. Related literature and the objective of this paper
In this section we first recall the existing results on approachability with partial moni-
toring and then explain in a more technical way the objectives of the paper.
Results on approachability with partial monitoring
Concerning the primal characterization. Kohlberg (1975)—see also Mertens et al.,
1994—studied specific frameworks (induced by repeated games with incomplete informa-
tion, see Section 6) in which approachability depends mildly on the signaling structure.
A property that we define in the sequel and call the upper-right-corner property holds
between the payoff function r and the signaling structure H. Based on this property
it is rather straightforward to show that the primal characterization for the (r,H)–
approachability of orthants stated in Theorem 1 still holds. Section 6 provides more
details on this matter.
Concerning the dual characterization. Perchet (2011a) provided the following dual
characterization of approachable closed convex sets under partial monitoring:
C ⊆ Rd is (r,H)–approachable ⇐⇒ ∀h ∈ F , ∃x ∈ ∆(I), m(x,h) ⊆ C . (5)
It indeed generalizes Blackwell’s dual characterization (4) with full monitoring, as F can
be identified with ∆(J ) in this case.
Based on (5), Perchet constructed the first (r,H)–approachability strategy of any
closed convex set C; it was based on calibrated forecasts of the vectors of F . Because of
this, the per-stage computational complexity of this strategy increases indefinitely and
rates of convergence cannot be inferred. Moreover, the construction of this strategy is
unhelpful to infer a generic primal characterization.
Mannor et al. (2011) tackled the issue of complexity and devised an efficient (r,H)–
approachability strategy for the case where the target set is some polytope. This strategy
has a fixed and bounded per-stage computational complexity. Moreover, its rates of
convergence are independent of d: they are of the order of n−1/5, where n is the number
of stages.
On the other hand, Perchet and Quincampoix (2011) unified the setups of approach-
ability with full or partial monitoring and characterized approachable closed (convex)
sets using some lifting to the Wasserstein space of probability measures on ∆(I)×∆(J ).
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Objectives and technical content of the paper
This paper focuses on the primal characterization of approachable closed convex sets
with partial monitoring. First, note that if a closed convex set is (r,H)–approachable,
then it is also (r,Full)–approachable, and therefore, by (4), any containing half-space is
necessarily one-shot r–approachable. The question is: When is the latter statement a suf-
ficient condition for (r,H)–approachability? The difficulty, as noted already by Perchet
(2011a) and recalled at the beginning of Section 5, is that since the notions of approach-
ability with full or partial monitoring do not coincide, it can be that a closed convex set
is not (r,H)–approachable while every containing half-space is one-shot r–approachable.
Some situations where the usual dual characterization is indeed sufficient are formed
first, by the cases when the target set is a half-space (with no condition on the game),
and second, by the cases when the target set is an orthant and the structure (r,H) of
the game satisfies the upper-right-corner property. This first series of results is detailed
in Sections 4 and 5. Some light is then shed in Section 6 on the construction of Kohlberg
(1975) for the case of repeated games with incomplete information.
The rest of the paper (Sections 7, 8, and 9) relies on no assumption on the structure
(r,H) of the game. It discusses a primal condition based on one-shot approachability
of half-spaces with respect to a modified payoff function r˜H that encompasses the links
between the signaling structure H and the original payoff function r. Depending on the
geometry of the target closed convex set, this primal condition is stated in the original
payoff space (for orthants, Section 7) or in some lifted space (for polytopes or general
convex sets, see Section 8 and 9). We explain in Example 1 why such a lifting seems
inevitable.
We also illustrate how the exhibited primal condition leads to a new (and efficient)
strategy for (r,H)–approachability in the case of target sets given by polytopes. (Sec-
tion 7 does it for orthants and the result extends to polytopes via Lemma 2.) This new
strategy is based on sequences of (modified) payoffs, as in Kohlberg (1975), and is not
only based on sequences of signals, as in Perchet (2011a), Mannor et al. (2011). The
construction of this strategy also entails some non-linear approachability results (both
in full and partial monitoring).
4. Primal approachability of half-spaces
We first focus on half-spaces, not only because they are the simplest convex sets, but
because they are the cornerstones of the primal characterization of Blackwell (1956).
The following proposition ties one-shot r–approachability with (r,H)–approachability of
half-spaces.
Proposition 1. For all half-spaces Chs, for all signaling structures H,
Chs is (r,H)–approachable ⇐⇒ Chs is one-shot r–approachable .
This result is a mere interpolation of two well-known results for the extremal cases
where H = Full and H = Dark. The former case corresponds to Blackwell’s primal
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characterization. In the latter case, Nature could always play the same y ∈ ∆(J ) at all
rounds and the player cannot infer the value of this y. So he needs to have an action
x ∈ ∆(I) such that r(x, y) belongs to Chs, no matter y.
Stated differently, the above proposition indicates that as far as half-spaces are con-
cerned, the approachability is independent of the signaling structure.
Proof. Only the direct implication is to be proven, as the converse implication is im-
mediate by the above discussion about games in the dark. We thus assume that Chs
is (r,H)–approachable. Using the characterization (5) of (r,H)–approachable sets, one
then has that
∀h ∈ F , ∃x ∈ ∆(I), m(x,h) ⊂ Chs ,
which implies that
∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), ∃x ∈ ∆(I), r(x, y) ∈ Chs .
The implication holds because r(x, y) ∈ m(x,h) when h = H(y). Now, let a ∈ Rd and
b ∈ R such that Chs =
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω, a〉 6 b}. The above property can be further
restated as
∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), ∃x ∈ ∆(I), 〈r(x, y), a〉 6 b ,
or equivalently,
max
y∈∆(J )
min
x∈∆(I)
〈r(x, y), a〉 6 b .
By von Neumann’s min-max theorem, we then have that
min
x∈∆(I)
max
y∈∆(J )
〈r(x, y), a〉 6 b , that is, ∃x0 ∈ ∆(I), ∀y ∈ ∆(J ), 〈r(x0, y), a〉 6 b .
This is exactly the one-shot approachability of Chs.
Since the complement of any δ–neighborhood of a half-space is also a half-space, we
get the following additional equivalence, in view of the respective definitions of exclud-
ability and one-shot excludability.
Corollary 1. For all half-spaces Chs, for all signaling structures H,
Chs is (r,H)–excludable ⇐⇒ Chs is one-shot r–excludable .
5. Primal approachability of orthants
under the upper-right-corner property
This section is devoted to stating a primal characterization of (r,H)–approachable or-
thants, i.e., sets of the form
Corth(a) =
{
a− ω : ω ∈ (R+)d
}
for some a ∈ Rd. Orthants are the key for extension to polytopes, because, as we will
discuss later, up to some lifting in higher dimensions, every polytope can be seen as an
orthant.
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We start by indicating that the primal characterization stated in the previous section
in terms of the original payoff function r does not extend directly to general convex
sets, not even to orthants—at least without an additional assumption. However, in this
section we state such a sufficient assumption for its extension. We study the most general
primal characterization in Section 7, which will involve a modified payoff function for
the one-shot approachability of half-spaces.
Counter-example (adapted from Perchet, 2011a). We show that the equivalence
of Proposition 1 does not hold in general if the convex set C at hand is not a half-
space. To do so, we exhibit a game and a set C which is (r,Full)–approachable but not
(r,Dark)–approachable. We set I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}, and the payoff function r
is given by the matrix
L R
T (0, 0) (1,−1)
B (−1, 1) (0, 0)
We consider the set Corth
(
(0, 0)
)
= (R−)2. This set is (r,Full)–approachable as indicated
by the dual characterization (4): for each α ∈ [0, 1],
r
(
αT + (1− α)B, αL+ (1− α)R) = (0, 0) ∈ Corth((0, 0)) .
On the other hand, consider the signaling structure H = Dark, for which the only flag
is ∅. For all actions of the player, i.e., for all α ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
m
(
αT + (1− α)B, ∅) = {r(αT + (1− α)B, y) : y ∈ ∆(J )}
=
{
(λ,−λ) ; λ ∈ [−α, 1− α]} * Corth((0, 0)) .
Therefore, the characterization of r–approachable closed convex sets (5) does not hold
when playing in the dark.
Upper-right-corner property. We define the upper-right corner function R : ∆(I)×
F → Rd of the compatible payoff function m in a component-wise manner. We write
the coordinates of R as R = (R1, . . . , Rd) and set, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d},
∀x ∈ ∆(I), ∀h ∈ F , Rk(x,h) = max
{
ωk : ω =
(
ω1, . . . , ωd
) ∈ m(x,h)} .
The construction of R is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that the `2–norm of R is in general
bounded by M
√
d.
The term “upper-right corner” comes from the fact that R(x,h) is the (component-
wise) smallest a such that m(x,h) ⊆ Corth(a). Controlling the distance of R(x,h) to the
orthant entails controlling the distance of the whole set m(x,h) to it. Thus, the point
R(x,h) is in some sense the worst-case payoff vector associated with m(x,h).
Of course, R(x,h) is in general not a feasible payoff vector, i.e., R(x,h) 6∈ m(x,h).
We are interested in this section in the case where the upper-right corner is indeed a
feasible payoff—an assumption that we call the upper-right-corner property.
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Figure 2: Four illustrations of compatible payoff sets m(x,h) and associated upper-right
corners R(x,h). In the two examples on the left, this upper-right corner does not belong
to the set, while it does in the two on the right. (When it is so for all x and h, the game
is said to have the upper-right-corner property.)
Definition 2. The game (r,H) with partial monitoring has the upper-right-corner prop-
erty if
∀x ∈ ∆(I), ∀h ∈ F , R(x,h) ∈ m(x,h) .
Of course, games with full monitoring have the upper-right-corner property, as for
them F can be identified with ∆(J ) and m can be identified with the function {r} with
values in the set of all singleton subsets of Rd.
By definition, in a game with the upper-right-corner property, the `2–norm of R is
bounded by M .
Primal characterization under the upper-right-corner property. The following
proposition was implicitly used by Kohlberg (1975).
Proposition 2. For all games (r,H) with partial monitoring that have the upper-right-
corner property, for all orthants Corth(a), where a ∈ Rd,
Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable
⇐⇒ every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r–approachable.
Stated differently, using Blackwell’s primal characterization of approachability (The-
orem 1), an orthant Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable in a game (r,H) satisfying the upper-
right-corner property if and only if Corth(a) is r–approachable with full monitoring.
Proof. The direct implication is proved by applying Proposition 1 to any half-space
Chs ⊃ Corth(a), which is in particular (r,H)–approachable as soon as Corth(a) is. The
interesting implication is thus the converse one.
So, we assume that every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r–approachable and,
following Kohlberg’s original proof and inspired by Blackwell’s strategy in the case of
full monitoring, we construct an (r,H)–approachability strategy of Corth(a).
Flags observed, mixed payoffs obtained. For simplicity, assume first that after stage
n, the observation made by the player is not just the random signal sn but the entire
10
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corners R(x,h). In the two examples on the left, this upper-right corner does not belong
to the set, while it does in the two on the right. ( hen it is so for all x and h, the game
is said to have the upper-right-corner property.)
Definition 2. The game (r,H) with partial monitoring has the upper-right-corner prop-
erty if
∀x ∈ ∆(I), ∀h ∈ F , R(x,h) ∈ m(x,h) .
Of course, games with full monitoring have the upper-right-corner property, as for
them F can be identified with ∆(J ) and m can be identified with the function {r} with
values in the set of all singleton subsets of Rd.
By definition, in a game with the upper-right-corner property, the `2–norm of R is
bounded by M .
Primal characterization under the upper-right-corner property. The following
proposition was implicitly used by Kohlberg (1975).
Proposition 2. For all games (r,H) with partial monitoring that have the upper-right-
corner property, for all orthants Corth(a), where a ∈ Rd,
Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable
⇐⇒ every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r–approachable.
Stated differently, using Blackwell’s primal characterization of approachability (The-
orem 1), an orthant Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable in a game (r,H) satisfying the upper-
right-corner property if and only if Corth(a) is r–approachable with full monitoring.
Proof. The direct implication is proved by applying Proposition 1 to any half-space
Chs ⊃ Corth(a), which is in particular (r,H)–approachable as soon as Corth(a) is. The
interesting implication is thus the converse one.
So, we assume that every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r–approachable and,
following Kohlberg’s original proof and inspired by Blackwell’s strategy in the case of
full monitoring, we construct an (r,H)–approachability strategy of Corth(a).
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Flags observed, mixed payoffs obtained. For simplicity, assume first that after stage
n, the observation made by the player is not just the random signal sn but the entire
vector of probability distributions over the signals hn = H(yn). (We will indicate
below why this is not a restrictive assumption.) We consider the surrogate payoff vector
Rn = R(xn,hn), which is a quantity thus observed by the player. When Rn does not
already belong to Corth(a), since the latter set is convex, the half-space Chs, n defined by
Chs, n =
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω − piCorth(a)(Rn), Rn − piCorth(a)(Rn)〉 6 0}
contains Corth(a), where we recall that piCorth(a) is the orthogonal projection onto Corth(a).
By assumption, Chs, n is thus one-shot r–approachable. That is, there exists xn+1 ∈ ∆(I)
such that
∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), 〈r(xn+1, y)− piCorth(a)(Rn), Rn − piCorth(a)(Rn)〉 6 0 . (6)
By the upper-right-corner property, Rn+1 ∈ m(xn+1,hn+1), which entails that there
exists y′n+1 ∈ ∆(J ) such that H
(
y′n+1
)
= hn+1 and Rn+1 = r
(
xn+1, y
′
n+1
)
. As a con-
sequence, Rn+1 belongs to Chs, n and the sequence (Rn) satisfies the following condition,
usually referred to as Blackwell’s condition:〈
Rn+1 − piCorth(a)
(
Rn
)
, Rn − piCorth(a)
(
Rn
)〉
6 0 .
This condition is trivially satisfied when Rn already belongs to Corth(a). Just as (2) leads
to (3), this condition implies that dCorth(a)
(
Rn
)
6 2M/√n.
Now, (1/n)
∑n
t=1 r(xt, yt) ∈ (1/n)
∑n
t=1m(xt,ht) and, as R is the upper-right corner
function, (1/n)
∑n
t=1m(xt,ht) ⊆ Corth
(
Rn
)
. That is, (1/n)
∑n
t=1 r(xt, yt) is component-
wise smaller than Rn. Since the distance to the orthant Corth(a) equals, for all ω ∈ Rd,
dCorth(a)(ω) =
√√√√ d∑
k=1
max{ωk − ak, 0}2 , (7)
we get that
dCorth(a)
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(xt, yt)
)
6 dCorth(a)
(
Rn
)
6 2M√
n
.
Finally, by martingale convergence theorems (e.g., the Hoeffding–Azuma inequality), the
sequence of the distances dCorth(a)
(
rn
)
converges uniformly to 0 with respect to strategies
of Nature. The above arguments are illustrated in Figure 3.
Flags not observed, only random signals observed, pure payoffs. It remains to relax
the assumption that the flags hn are observed, while only the signals sn drawn at random
according to H(in, jn) are. A standard trick in the literature of partial monitoring (see
Kohlberg, 1975, Mertens et al., 1994, Lugosi et al., 2008) solves the issue, together with
martingale convergence theorems and the fact that the upper-right corner R is a Lipschitz
function for a well-chosen metric over sets (see Lemma 1 below). We briefly describe
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aRn
(1/n)
∑n
t=1m(xt,ht)
Chs, n
m(xn+1,h)
m(xn+1,h
′)
R(xn+1,h)
R(xn+1,h
′)
Figure 3: Illustration of the guarantee (6), in the case when the sets of compatible payoffs
m(x,h) are all given by rectangles.
sequence of elements γb ∈ (0, 1) converging to 0 is needed. The same mixed distribution
x(b) is played at all stages of block b by the player; that is, xbL+t = x(b) for all 1 6 t 6 Lb.
This distribution is chosen by mixing a distribution x(b)orig. satisfying a constraint of the
form of (6) with the uniform distribution. This is done with respective weights 1 − γb
and γb. The distribution x(b) then puts a positive probability mass of at least γb > 0
on all actions. Doing so, an estimator of the average flag on block b can be constructed.
Its accuracy, as well as the price to pay for the mixing, depend on γb and Lb. By such
a price, we mean how farther away we are from Corth(a) because we did not play x(b)orig.
but x(b) instead. Informally, each block now plays the role of a stage in the setting
above when flags were observed. One can show that suitable values of Lb and γb lead
to uniform convergence of the average payoffs, measured in terms of pure actions xt, to
Corth(a). Also, similar martingale convergence arguments show that measuring payoffs
in terms of the mixed actions xt or pure actions it does not matter.
As indicated, we omit the technical proof of these facts (it already appeared in all the
given references) but notice, however, that rates of convergence are adversely affected by
this trick.
Remark 1. The construction in the proof above shows that under the upper-right-
corner property, it is necessary and sufficient to control the behavior of the upper-right
corners Rn.
This property was used only to show that Rn+1 is equal to some r(xn+1, y′n+1) and
thus that the sequence (Rn) satisfies Blackwell’s condition. When the property is not
satisfied anymore, the sequence of the upper-right corners may fail to satisfy this condi-
tion. For instance, in the counter-example at the beginning of the present section, the
upper-right corners equal
∀α ∈ [0, 1], R(αT + (1− α)B, ∅) = (α, 1− α) ,
so that, for all strategies of the player, Rn = (λ, 1 − λ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the
distance of Rn to Corth
(
(0, 0)
)
is always larger than 1/
√
2.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the guarantee (6), in the case when the sets of compatible payoffs
m(x,h) are all given by rectangles.
this trick without working out the lengthy details. Time is divided into blocks of time
indexed by b = 1, 2, . . . and with respective (large and increasing) lengths Lb. Another
sequence of elements γb ∈ (0, 1) converging to 0 is needed. The same mixed distribution
x(b) is played at all stages of block b by the player; that is, xbL+t = x(b) for all 1 6 t 6 Lb.
This distribution is chosen by mixing a distribution x(b)orig. satisfying a constraint of the
form of (6) with the uniform distribution. This is done with respective weights 1 − γb
and γb. The distribution x(b) then puts a positive probability mass of at least γb > 0
on all actions. Doing so, an estimator of the average flag on block b can be constructed.
Its accuracy, as well as the price to pay for the mixing, depend on γb and Lb. By such
a price, we mean how farther away we are from Corth(a) because we did not play x(b)orig.
but x(b) instead. Informally, each block now plays the role of a stage in the setting
above when flags were observed. One can show that suitable values of Lb and γb lead
to uniform convergence of the average payoffs, measured in terms of pure actions xt, to
Corth(a). Also, similar martingale convergence arguments show that measuring payoffs
in terms of the mixed actions xt or pure actions it does not matter.
As indicated, we omit the technical proof of these facts (it already appeared in all the
given references) but notice, however, that rates of convergence are adversely affected by
this trick.
Remark 1. The construction in the proof above shows that under the upper-right-
corner property, it is necessary and sufficient to control the behavior of the upper-right
corners Rn.
This property was used only to show that Rn+1 is equal to some r(xn+1, y′n+1) and
thus that the sequence (Rn) satisfies Blackwell’s condition. When the property is not
satisfied anymore, the sequence of the upper-right corners may fail to satisfy this condi-
tion. For instance, in the counter-example at the beginning of the present section, the
upper-right corners equal
∀α ∈ [0, 1], R(αT + (1− α)B, ∅) = (α, 1− α) ,
so that, for all strategies of the player, Rn = (λ, − λ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the
distance of Rn to Corth
(
(0, 0)
)
is always larger than 1/
√
2.
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6. Intermezzo:
Kohlberg’s repeated games with incomplete information
We consider in this section a different, yet related framework, which is the main focus
of Kohlberg (1975). We first describe a setting where d games with partial monitoring are
to be played simultaneously, and then establish the formal connection with Kohlberg’s
results.
Simultaneous games with partial monitoring. We consider d such games, with
common action sets I and J for the player and Nature and common set H of signals,
but with possibly different payoff functions and signaling structures. We index these
games by g. For each game g ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the player’s payoff function is denoted by
r(g) : I × J → R and the signaling structure is given by H(g) : I × J → ∆(H), with
associated maximal information mapping H(g) : ∆(J )→ ∆(H)I .
We put some restrictions on the strategies of the player and of Nature. The player
may only choose one action xt ∈ ∆(I) at each stage t, the same for all games g. On the
other hand, Nature can choose different mixed actions y(g)t in each game g, but these
need to be non-revealing, that is, they need to induce the same flags. More formally,
they need to be picked in the following set, which we assume to be non-empty:
NR =
{(
y(1), . . . , y(d)
)∈ ∆(J )d : H(1)(y(1)) = · · · = H(d)(y(d))} . (8)
The above framework of simultaneous games can be embedded into an equivalent
game that fits the model studied in the previous sections. Indeed, by linearity of each
H(g), the set NR of non-revealing actions is a polytope, thus it is the convex hull of its
finite set of extremal points. We denote the cardinality of the latter by K and we write
its elements as
K =
{(
y
(g)
1
)
16g6d, . . . ,
(
y
(g)
K
)
16g6d
}
.
Each
(
y(g)
)
16g6d ∈ NR can then be represented by an element of ∆(K). Conversely,
each z = (zk)k6K ∈ ∆(K) induces the following element of NR:
Y (z) =
(
Y (g)(z)
)
16g6d =
K∑
k=1
zk
(
y
(g)
k
)
16g6d .
So, with no loss of generality, we can assume that K is the finite set of actions of Nature
and that, given z ∈ ∆(K) and x ∈ ∆(I), the payoff in the game g is r(g)(x, Y (g)(z)).
This defines naturally an auxiliary game with linear vector-valued payoff function
r : ∆(I)×∆(K)→ Rd and maximal information mapping H : ∆(K)→ ∆(H)I defined
by
r(x, z) =
(
r(g)
(
x, Y (g)(z)
))
16g6d
and H(z) = H(g)
(
Y (g)(z)
)
for all g.
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(The definition of H is independent of g by construction, as we restricted Nature to
use non-revealing strategies.) This maximal information mapping H corresponds to an
underlying signaling structure which we denote by H : I × K → ∆(H).
The game (r,H) constructed above satisfies the upper-right-corner property. Indeed,
for all h ∈H(∆(K)) and all x ∈ ∆(I),
m(x,h) =
{(
r(1)
(
x, Y (1)(z)
)
, . . . , r(d)
(
x, Y (d)(z)
))
: z ∈ ∆(K) s.t. H(z) = h
}
=
{(
r(1)
(
x, y(1)
)
, . . . , r(d)
(
x, y(d)
))
:
(
y(1), . . . , y(d)
) ∈ ∆(J )d s.t. H(1)(y(1)) = · · · = H(d)(y(d)) = h}.
Because of the separation of the variables in the constraint, the following set, given h,{(
y(1), . . . , y(d)
) ∈ ∆(J )d : H(1)(y(1)) = · · · = H(d)(y(d)) = h}
is a Cartesian product of subsets of ∆(J ). Thus, its image m(x,h) by the mapping(
y(1), . . . , y(d)
) ∈ ∆(J )d 7−→ (r(1)(x, y(1)), . . . , r(d)(x, y(d)))
is also a Cartesian product of closed intervals of R. In particular, the latter set contains
its upper-right corner, that is, R(x,h) ∈ m(x,h), as claimed.
We assume, with no loss of generality, that in these simultaneous games, Nature max-
imizes the payoffs and the player minimizes them. A question that naturally arises—and
whose answer will be needed below—is to determine for which vectors a = (a1, . . . , ad) ∈
Rd the player can simultaneously guarantee that his average payoff will be smaller than
ag in the limit in each game g ∈ {1, . . . , d}; that is, to determine which orthants Corth(a)
are (r,H)–approachable. By the exhibited upper-right-corner property, Proposition 2
shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is that all containing half-spaces
of Corth(a) be one-shot r–approachable. These half-spaces are parameterized by the
convex distributions q ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}) and are denoted by
C(q)hs =
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω, q〉 6 〈a, q〉} . (9)
Stated equivalently, the orthant Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable if and only if the value
of the zero-sum game with payoff function (x, z) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(K) 7→ 〈r(x, z), q〉 is smaller
than 〈a, q〉 for all q ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}).
Kohlberg’s model of repeated games with incomplete information. The set-
ting of repeated games with incomplete information, introduced by Aumann and Maschler
(1995), relies on the same finite family of games
(
r(g), H(g)
)
, where g ∈ {1, . . . , d},
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as described above. They will however not be played simultaneously. Instead, a sin-
gle game (state) G ∈ {1, . . . , d} is drawn according to some probability distribution
p ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}) known by both the player and Nature. Yet only Nature (and not the
player) is informed of the true state G. A repeated game with partial monitoring then
takes place between the player and Nature in the G–th game. Payoffs are evaluated in
expectation with respect to the random draw of G according to p.
For simplicity, we assume that all mappingsH(g) have the same range2 and, with no
loss of generality, that p has full support. Because of these two properties, the considered
setting of repeated games with incomplete information can then be embedded, from the
player’s viewpoint, into the above-described setting of d simultaneous games under the
restriction that Nature resorts to non-revealing strategies. Indeed, from the player’s
viewpoint and because of the identical range of the H(g), the mixed action used by
Nature in the game G can be thought of as the G–th component of some vector of
mixed actions in the set NR defined in (8). We use the notation defined above: as
payoffs are evaluated in expectation, the payoff function is formed by the inner products
(x, z) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(K) 7→ 〈r(x, z), p〉.
We recall that Nature maximizes the payoff and that the player minimizes it. For
each q ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}), we denote by u(q) the value of the one-shot zero-sum game
Γ(q) with payoffs (x, z) ∈ ∆(I) ×∆(K) 7→ 〈r(x, z), q〉. We show that, as proved in the
mentioned references, the value U of this repeated game, as a function of the distribution
p, may be larger than u(p) and is given by cav[u](p), where cav[u] is the smallest concave
function above u.
First, the so-called splitting lemma shows that U is concave. Therefore, we have
U > cav[u]. (For the splitting lemma, see Aumann and Maschler, 1995 and also Mertens
et al., 1994, Section V.1 or Sorin, 2002.) The inequality of interest to us is the converse
one. Using the concavity of the mapping cav[u], Kohlberg (1975, Corollary 2.4) proves
that for all p ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}), there exists some ap ∈ Rd such that
cav[u](p) = 〈ap, p〉 and ∀ q ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}), cav[u](q) 6 〈ap, q〉 .
In particular, u(q) 6 〈ap, q〉 for all q ∈ ∆({1, . . . , d}). The equivalence stated after (9)
shows that Corth(ap) is therefore (r,H)–approachable. Hence, no matter the strategy of
Nature, the payoff in state G is asymptotically smaller than the G–th component of ap.
(This is true for all realizations of G.) As a consequence, in expectation (with respect
to the random choice of G), the payoff is smaller than 〈ap, p〉 = cav[u](p). This shows
that U(p) 6 cav[u](p).
In conclusion, Kohlberg (1975) implicitly used the consequences of the upper-right-
corner property detailed above when constructing an optimal strategy for the uninformed
player. A close inspection reveals that Lemma 5.4 therein does not hold anymore in
2In full generality, when this is not the case, Nature may resort to strategies that reveal that the
true state G belongs to some strict subset of {1, . . . , d}, and the player must adapt his strategy in
correspondence with this knowledge, see Kohlberg (1975). But our assumption already captures the
basic idea of the use of approachability in this framework and the alluded technical adaptations are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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the more general framework without the upper-right-corner property (in particular, one
might want to read it again with Remark 1 in mind).
7. Primal approachability of orthants in the general case
We noted that the primal characterization in terms of one-shot r–approachability of
containing half-spaces stated in Proposition 2 did not extend to games (r,H) without
the upper-right-corner property. We show in this section that it holds true in the general
case when one-shot approachability is with respect to the modified payoff function r˜H :
∆(I)×∆(J )→ Rd defined as follows:
∀x ∈ ∆(I), ∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), r˜H(x, y) = R
(
x,H(y)
)
.
The change of payoff function can be intuitively explained as follows. As noted in Sec-
tion 5, when the target sets are given by orthants (and only because of this), the behavior
of (averages of) sets of compatible payoffs is dictated by their upper-right corners. Now,
the upper-right-corner property indicated that even when measuring payoffs with r, the
worst-case payoffs were given by the upper-right corners and that it was thus necessary
and sufficient to consider the latter. If this property does not hold, then evaluating
actions with r˜H enables and forces the consideration of these corners.
Of course, in the case of full monitoring, as follows from the comments after Defini-
tion 2, no modification takes place in the payoff function, that is, r˜Full = r.
The main result of this section is the following primal characterization. The rest of
this section will then show how it leads to a new approachability strategy under partial
monitoring, based on surrogate payoffs (upper-right corner payoffs) and not only on
signals or on estimated flags, as previously done in the literature (e.g., in the references
mentioned in the last part of the proof of Proposition 2).
Theorem 2. For all games (r,H) with partial monitoring, for all orthants Corth(a),
where a ∈ Rd,
Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable
⇐⇒ every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r˜H–approachable.
The proof of this theorem is as follows. The dual characterization (5) indicates
that a necessary and sufficient condition of (r,H)–approachability for Corth(a) is that
for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that m(x,H(y)) ⊆ Corth(a). Since, by
construction of R, the smallest orthant (in the sense of inclusion) in which m
(
x,H(y)
)
is contained is precisely Corth
(
r˜H(x, y)
)
, the necessary and sufficient condition can be
restated as the requirement that for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that
r˜H(x, y) ∈ Corth(a). Now, this reformulated dual characterization of approachability in
the context of orthants is seen to be equivalent to the following primal characterization,
which concludes the proof of the theorem.
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Proposition 3. For all games (r,H) with partial monitoring, for all orthants Corth(a),
where a ∈ Rd,
∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), ∃x ∈ ∆(I), r˜H(x, y) ∈ Corth(a)
⇐⇒ every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(a) is one-shot r˜H–approachable.
Before proving this proposition, we need to state some properties of the function r˜H .
Given two points a, a′ ∈ Rd, the notation a 4 a′ means that a is component-wise smaller
than a′—or equivalently, that a belongs to the orthant Corth(a′).
Lemma 1. The function r˜H is Lipschitz continuous. It is also convex in its first ar-
gument and concave in its second argument, in the sense that, for all x, x′ ∈ ∆(I), all
y, y′ ∈ ∆(J ), and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
r˜H
(
λx+ (1− λ)x′, y) 4 λ r˜H(x, y) + (1− λ) r˜H(x′, y)
and λ r˜H(x, y) + (1− λ) r˜H(x, y′) 4 r˜H
(
x, λy + (1− λ)y′) .
Proof. Convexity and concavity follow from the concavity and the convexity of m for
inclusion. Formally, it follows from the very definition (1) of m and from the linearity of
r and H that, for all x, x′ ∈ ∆(I), all h,h′ ∈ F , and λ ∈ [0, 1],
m
(
λx+ (1− λ)x′, h) ⊆ λm(x,h) + (1− λ)m(x′,h)
and λm(x,h) + (1− λ)m(x,h′) ⊆ m(x, λh+ (1− λ)h′) .
The second part of the lemma follows by taking upper-right corners, which is a linear
and non-decreasing operation (for the respective partial orders ⊆ and 4).
As for the Lipschitz property of r˜H , it follows from a rewriting of m
(
x,H(y)
)
as
m
(
x,H(y)
)
=
∑
b∈B
φb
(
H(y)
)
r
(
x, H−1(b)
)
,
where B is a finite subset of F , the φb are Lipschitz functions F → [0, 1], andH−1 is the
pre-image function ofH, which takes values in the set of compact subsets of ∆(J ). This
rewriting was proved in Mannor et al. (2011, Lemma 6.1 and Remark 6.1). We equip the
set of compact subsets of the Euclidian ball with center (0, . . . 0) and radius M , in which
m takes its values, with the Hausdorff distance. For this distance, x 7→ r(x, H−1(b)) is
M–Lipschitz for each b ∈ B. All in all, given the boundedness of the φb and of r, the
mapping (x, y) 7→ m(x,H(y)) is also Lipschitz continuous. Since taking the upper-right
corner is a Lipschitz mapping as well (for the Hausdorff distance), we get, by composition,
the desired Lipschitz property for r˜H .
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3. (Note that it needs a proof and that it is
not implied by the various results discussed in Section 5. Indeed, (r˜H , H) is an auxiliary
game which, by construction, has the upper-right-corner property, but r˜H is not linear,
while linearity of the payoff function was a crucial feature of the setting studied therein.)
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Proof of Proposition 3. We start with the direct implication and consider some contain-
ing half-space Chs. The latter is parameterized by α ∈ Rd and β ∈ R, and equals
Chs =
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈α, ω〉 6 β} .
Since Chs contains the orthant Corth(a), there are sequences (ωn) in Chs with components
tending to −∞. Therefore, we necessarily have that α < 0. The convexity/concavity of
r˜H in the sense of 4 thus entails that the function Gα,β : (x, y) 7−→
〈
α, r˜H(x, y)
〉− β is
also convex/concave. The continuity of Gα,β follows from the one of r˜H . The Sion–Fan
lemma applies and guarantees that
min
x∈∆(I)
max
y∈∆(J )
Gα,β(x, y) = max
y∈∆(J )
min
x∈∆(I)
Gα,β(x, y) ,
(the suprema and infima are all attained and are denoted by maxima and minima). Now,
by assumption, for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that r˜H(x, y) ∈ Corth(a).
This means that the above max minGα,β is non-positive. Putting all things together, we
have proved that
min
x∈∆(I)
max
y∈∆(J )
Gα,β(x, y) 6 0 .
That is, there exists x0 ∈ ∆(I), e.g., the element attaining the above maximum, such
that for all y ∈ ∆(J ), one has Gα,β(x0, y) 6 0, or, equivalently, r˜H(x0, y) ∈ Corth(a).
This property is exactly the stated one-shot r˜H–approachability of Corth(a).
Conversely, assume that there exists some y0 ∈ ∆(J ) such that, for all x ∈ ∆(I), one
has r˜H(x, y0) 6∈ Corth(a). By continuity of r˜H and closedness of Corth(a), there exists some
δ > 0 such that dCorth(a)
(
r˜H(x, y0)
)
> δ for all x ∈ ∆(I). Now, as indicated around (7),
the distance to Corth(a) is non-decreasing for 4. In view of the convexity of r˜H in its first
argument, this shows that we also have dCorth(a)(z) > δ for all elements z of the convex
hull Cr˜H ,y0 of the set
{
r˜H(x, y0) : x ∈ ∆(I)
}
. That is, the closed convex sets Cr˜H ,y0 ,
which is compact, and Corth(a), which is closed, are disjoint and thus, by the Hahn–
Banach theorem, are strictly separated by some hyperplane. One of the two half-spaces
thus defined, namely, the one not containing Cr˜H ,y0 , is not one-shot r˜H–approachable.
A new approachability strategy of an orthant under partial monitoring
Theorem 2 suggests an approachability strategy based on surrogate payoffs and not only
on the information gained, i.e., based on the mapping r˜H and not only on the signal-
ing structure H (and the estimated flags). The first approach was already considered
by Kohlberg (1975) while other works, like Perchet (2011a) and Mannor et al. (2011),
resorted to the second one. The considered strategy is an adaptation of Blackwell’s
strategy (which was recalled after the statement of Theorem 1): such an adaptation is
possible as the latter strategy only relies on the one-shot approachability of half-spaces,
which is satisfied here with the surrogate payoffs r˜H .
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Description and convergence analysis of the strategy. As in the proof of Propo-
sition 2, we assume initially that flags ht = H(yt) are observed at the end of each round
t and that mixed payoffs are to be controlled. The player then knows his mixed payoffs
r˜H,t := r˜H(xt, yt) = R
(
xt,ht
)
and aims at controlling his average payoffs, which we
recall are denoted by r˜H,n. Similarly to what was done in the proof of Proposition 2,
the one-shot r˜H–approachability of the containing half-spaces of Corth(a) entails that for
each round n, there exists xn+1 ∈ ∆(I) such that
∀ y ∈ ∆(J ),
〈
r˜H(xn+1, y)− piCorth(a)
(
r˜H,n
)
, r˜H,n − piCorth(a)
(
r˜H,n
)〉
6 0 .
The sequence
(
r˜H,n
)
thus satisfies Blackwell’s condition and as a result we get
dCorth(a)
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
r˜H(xt, yt)
)
6 2M
√
d√
n
.
(See again the proof of Proposition 2 for this derivation and keep in mind that in
the present setting where the upper-right-corner property is not satisfied, R is only
bounded in `2–norm by M
√
d.) Since r(xt, yt) ∈ m
(
xt,H(yt)
) ⊆ Corth(r˜H(xt, yt)), we
get r(xt, yt) 4 r˜H(xt, yt) and, in view again of (7),
dCorth(a)
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
r(xt, yt)
)
6 dCorth(a)
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
r˜H(xt, yt)
)
6 2M
√
d√
n
.
The same trick of playing i.i.d. in blocks as in the second part of the proof of Proposi-
tion 2, together with martingale convergence arguments, relaxes the assumptions of flags
being observed and payoffs being evaluated with mixed actions, leading to the desired
(r,H)–approachability strategy. (This is where we need the Lipschitzness properties
stated in Lemma 1 and its proof.) A more careful study, which we omit here for the sake
of brevity, shows that (r,H)–approachability takes place at a n−1/5–rate.
What we proved in passing. We proved in a constructive way that when an orthant
is (r,H)–approachable, it is also
(
r˜H ,Full)–approachable.
Conversely, assume that the equivalent conditions in Theorem 2 are not satisfied,
i.e., that the orthant at hand, Corth(a), is not (r,H)–approachable. Then, (the proof
of) Proposition 3 indicates that there exists some y0 ∈ ∆(J ) such that the set Corth(a)
and the convex hull of
{
r˜H(x, y0), x ∈ ∆(I)
}
are strictly separated. This implies in
particular that Corth(a) is
(
r˜H ,Full
)
–excludable, and thus is not
(
r˜H ,Full
)
–approachable.
Putting all things together, we have proved the following equivalence:
Corth(a) is (r,H)–approachable
⇐⇒ Corth(a) is
(
r˜H ,Full
)
–approachable
⇐⇒ Corth(a) is not
(
r˜H ,Full
)
–excludable.
Note that the
(
r˜H ,Full
)
–approachability is a form of non-linear approachability, by which
we mean that the function r˜H is not linear and yet, approachability is possible. This
result could be generalized (but we omit the description of the extension for the sake of
concision).
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On the computational complexity of the above-described strategy. The strat-
egy we have exhibited reduces to solving, at each stage, a program of the form
min
xn+1∈∆(I)
{
max
y∈∆(J )
〈
r˜H(xn+1, y)− β, α
〉}
for some vectors α, β ∈ Rd. At first sight, it cannot be written as a finite linear program
as r˜H is not a linear function of its arguments. However, as proved in Mannor et al. (2011,
Section 7.1), the function r˜H is actually piecewise linear; that is, there exist some finite
liftings of ∆(I) and ∆(J ) with respect to which r˜H is linear. (These liftings only need
to be computed once, before the game starts.) Moreover, the per-step computational
complexity of our strategy is constant (in fact, it is polynomial in the sizes of these
liftings; see Mannor et al., 2011 for more details).
8. Primal approachability of polytopes
Recall that a convex set Cpolyt is a polytope if it is the intersection of a finite number of
half-spaces
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω, a`〉 6 b`
}
, for a`, b` ∈ Rd and ` ranging in some finite set L.
That is,
Cpolyt =
⋂
`∈L
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω, a`〉 6 b`
}
=
{
ω ∈ Rd : max
`∈L
〈ω, a`〉 − b` 6 0
}
. (10)
The following lemma (which is a mere exercice of rewriting) states that an approachabil-
ity problem of a polytope can be transformed into an approachability problem of some
negative orthant. We denote by (0)L = (0, . . . , 0) the null vector of RL. The negative
orthant of RL is then denoted by Corth
(
(0)L
)
.
Lemma 2. The convex polytope Cpolyt defined in (10) is (r,H)–approachable if and only
if the negative orthant Corth
(
(0)L
)
is (s,H)–approachable, where the vector-valued payoff
function s : ∆(I)×∆(J )→ RL is defined as
s(x, y) =
[
〈r(x, y), a`〉 − b`
]
`∈L
. (11)
Proof. The result follows from the equivalence (see, e.g., property 3 in Appendix A.1
of Perchet, 2011b) of the distances to Cpolyt given by
dCpolyt and dCorth((0)L)
(
T ( · )) ,
where T : Rd → RL is the linear transformation ω 7→ [〈ω, a`〉 − b`]`∈L.
Theorem 2 can then be rewritten, using Lemma 2 above, to provide the desired primal
characterization of polytopes.
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Corollary 2. Consider the convex polytope Cpolyt given by (10), together with the payoff
function s defined in (11). Then,
Cpolyt is (r,H)–approachable (12)
⇐⇒ every containing half-space of Corth
(
(0)L
)
is one-shot s˜H–approachable.
When Cpolyt is indeed (r,H)–approachable, the results of the previous section provide
an approachability strategy of Corth
(
(0)L
)
based on the transformed payoffs s˜H . This
strategy also approaches Cpolyt in view of Lemma 2, however it might not be representable
in the original space Rd, as demonstrated in the following (counter-)example.
Example 1. Consider on the one hand the polytope Cpolyt =
{
ω ∈ R : ω ∈ [−1, 1]}
and the associated linear transformation T defined by T (ω) = (ω − 1, −ω − 1) ∈ R2 for
all ω ∈ R. Consider on the other hand the following game. The sets of pure actions are
I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}, the signaling structure is H = Dark (with single signal
denoted by ∅), and the payoff function r is given by the matrix
L R
T −1 2
B −2 1
We identify ∆(I) and ∆(J ) with [0, 1].
We first discuss the dual condition (5) for (r,Dark)–approachability. For all x ∈ [0, 1],
we have m(x, ∅) = [−2 + x, 1 + x]. Thus, no mixed action x of the player is such that
m(x, ∅) is included in Cpolyt, which is therefore not (r,Dark)–approachable.
We now turn to the primal condition as stated by Corollary 2. We denote by T =
(T1, T2) the components of the linear transformation T . From the linearity of T , we
deduce from the above-stated expression of m (based on r) that the sets of compatible
payoffs in terms of s = T (r) are of the form T
(
m(x, ∅)). Taking the maxima, we thus
get, for all mixed actions x ∈ [0, 1] (and all y ∈ [0, 1] as the game is played in the dark),
s˜Dark(x, y) =
(
maxT1
(
[−2 + x, 1 + x]), maxT2
(
[−2 + x, 1 + x])
)
= (x, 1− x) .
Again, the necessary and sufficient condition for (r,H)–approachability of Cpolyt fails,
as no containing half-space of the negative orthant but two of them is one-shot s˜Dark–
approachable. More precisely, these half-spaces are parameterized by (p, 1 − p) where
p ∈ [0, 1] and correspond to the points {(t1, t2) ∈ R2 : p1t1 + p2t2 6 0}. Except for the
case when p = 0 or p = 1, these half-spaces are strictly separated from the convex set{
(x, 1− x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}.
The question now is whether we could have determined this by satisfying some primal
condition in the original space R. First, consider some containing half-space of Cpolyt,
typically, either (−∞, 1] or [−1,+∞). Their transformations by T into subsets of R2
are included respectively in (−∞, 0] × R or R × (−∞, 0]. These are precisely the only
two half-spaces that were one-shot s˜Dark–approachable (by resorting to one of the pure
actions). Now, and more importantly, consider the containing half-space of the negative
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orthant in R2 parameterized by p = 1/2, that is, Chs, 1/2 =
{
(t1, t2) ∈ R2 : t1 + t2 6 0
}
.
As indicated above, it is not one-shot s˜Dark–approachable. However, this half-space
contains all the original space, in the sense that T (R) ⊂ Chs, 1/2, as follows from simple
computations: T (ω) = (ω − 1) + (−ω − 1) = −2. Therefore, there is no hope to prove,
based even on general subsets of the original game with payoffs in R, that the necessary
and sufficient condition on the half-space Chs, 1/2 in the transformed space R2 fails.
The fundamental reason why the primal characterization in the transformed space
cannot be checked based on considerations in the original space is the following. In the
absence of a upper-right-corner property, the range of s˜Dark is outside the range of s but
we can only access to the latter based on the original space. The moral of this example
is that we have to consider some hidden containing half-spaces of the polytope Cpolyt in
order to establish some primal characterization: this is precisely what Condition (12)
does.
9. Primal approachability of general convex sets
We consider in this section the primal approachability of general closed convex sets C.
In the case of polytopes, Lemma 2 was essentially indicating that only finitely many
directions in Rd (the ones given by the a`) need be considered. In the case of general
convex sets, all directions are to be studied. We do so by resorting to support functions,
which we define based on the unit Euclidean sphere S = {ω ∈ Rd : ‖ω‖ = 1}. More
formally, the support function φC : S → R ∪ {+∞} of a set C ⊆ Rd is defined by
∀s ∈ S, φC(s) = sup
{〈c, s〉 : c ∈ C} .
We now construct a lifted setting in which one-shot approaching the containing half-
spaces for some payoff function will be equivalent to (r,H)–approaching the original
closed convex set C. This setting is given by some set of integrable functions on S. We
equip the latter with the (induced) Lebesgue measure, for which S has a finite measure.
That is, we consider the set L2(S) of Lebesgue square integrable functions S → R,
equipped with the inner product
(f, g) ∈ L2(S)× L2(S) 7−→
∫
S
f(s) g(s) ds .
The orthant in L2(S) corresponding to C ⊆ Rd is
Corth(φC) =
{
f ∈ L2(S) : f 6 φC
}
.
The description of the lifted setting is concluded by stating the considered payoff function
Φ : ∆(I) ×∆(J ) → L2(S). It indicates, as in the previous sections, how to transform
payoffs given the signaling structure H. Formally,
∀x ∈ ∆(I), ∀ y ∈ ∆(J ), Φ(x, y) = φm(x,H(y)) .
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The square integrability of Φ(x, y) follows its boundedness, which itself stems from the
boundedness of m
(
x,H(y)
)
. (See Lemma 3 in appendix, property 1, for a reminder of
this well-known result and others on support functions.)
We are now ready to state the primal characterization of approachability with partial
monitoring in the general case.
Theorem 3. For all games (r,H), for all closed convex sets C ⊂ Rd,
C is (r,H)–approachable
⇐⇒ every half-space Chs ⊃ Corth(φC) is one-shot Φ–approachable.
Proof. We first note that we can assume with no loss of generality that C is bounded thus
compact. Indeed, C is (r,H)–approachable if and only if its intersection C ∩r(∆(I×J ))
with the bounded convex set of feasible payoffs is approachable. This entails that φC ∈
L2(S).
Now, the proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2. In particular, we
exploit the dual characterization (5), that indicates that for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists
x ∈ ∆(I) such that m(x,H(y)) ⊆ C. It can be restated equivalently (see Lemma 3
in appendix, property 3) as stating that for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such
that Φ(x, y) 6 φC . We thus only need to show that the stated primal characterization is
equivalent to the latter condition.
We start with the direct implication (from the dual condition to the primal condition).
As recalled in the proof of Lemma 1, the function m is concave/convex, which, together
with properties 3 and 4 of Lemma 3, shows that Φ is also convex/concave. Moreover,
as proved at the end of the proof of Lemma 1, the function (x, y) 7→ m(x,H(y)) is
a Lipschitz function, with Lipschitz constant denoted by Lm, when the set of compact
subsets of the Euclidean ball of Rd with center (0, . . . , 0) and radius M is equipped with
the Hausdorff distance. This entails that Φ is also a Lipschitz function, with constant
LmV , where V is the volume of S for the induced Lebesgue measure. This is because
the Hausdorff distance δ between two sets D1 and D2 translates to a V δ–Euclidean
distance between φD1 and φD2 . Indeed, we have, by definition of the Hausdorff distance,
D1 ⊆ D2 + Bδ and D2 ⊆ D1 + Bδ, where Bδ is the Euclidian ball of Rd with center
(0, . . . , 0) and radius δ. Properties 4 and 1 of Lemma 3 respectively yield the inequalities∣∣φD1 − φD2∣∣ = max{φD1 − φD2 , φD2 − φD1} 6 φBδ 6 δ ,
with, by integration,
∥∥φD1 − φD2∥∥ 6 V δ.
The above-stated properties of Φ imply that for all ψ ∈ L2(S) with ψ > 0, the game
(x, y) 7→ 〈ψ, Φ(x, y)〉 has a value v(ψ), and that this value is achieved: there exists some
xψ ∈ ∆(I) such that
max
y∈∆(J )
〈
ψ, Φ(xψ, y)
〉
= v(ψ) = max
y∈∆(J )
min
x∈∆(I)
〈
ψ, Φ(x, y)
〉
.
Now, consider some half-space Chs containing Corth
(
φC
)
. It is of the form
Chs =
{
f ∈ L2(S) : 〈ψ, f〉 6 β} ,
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where necessarily, as can be shown by contradiction, ψ > 0. The dual condition is
satisfied by assumption, that is, for all y ∈ ∆(J ), there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that
Φ(x, y) ∈ Corth(φC), and therefore, Φ(x, y) ∈ Chs. Thus, v(ψ) 6 β, as can be seen with
its expression as a max/min. The mixed action xψ thus satisfies that
〈
ψ, Φ(xψ, y)
〉
6 β
for all y ∈ ∆(J ), which is exactly saying that Φ(xψ, y) ∈ Chs for all y ∈ ∆(J ). We
therefore proved the desired one-shot Φ–approachability of Chs.
Conversely, we assume that the dual condition is not satisfied, i.e., that there exists
some y0 ∈ ∆(J ) such that for no x ∈ ∆(I) one has Φ(x, y0) ∈ Corth(φC). We consider the
continuous thus compact image Φ
(
∆(I), y0
)
of ∆(I) by Φ( · , y0). Its Euclidean distance
to the closed set Corth(φC) is thus positive, we denote it by δ > 0. Now, the distance of
an element f ∈ L2(S) to Corth(φC) is given by
dCorth(φC)(f) =
∫
S
(
f(s)− φC(s)
)
+
ds .
Since in addition, Φ is convex in its first argument (as shown in the first part of this
proof), we have that dCorth(φC)(f) > δ not only for all f ∈ Φ
(
∆(I), y0
)
but also for all f
in the convex hull of Φ
(
∆(I), y0
)
. The latter set is pointwise bounded (by M , as follows
from property 1 of Lemma 3) and is formed by equicontinuous functions (they all areM–
Lipschitz continuous, as follows from property 2 of the same lemma). The Arzela–Ascoli
theorem thus ensures that the closure of this set is compact for the supremum norm ‖ · ‖∞
over S. As by integration ‖ · ‖∞ > ‖ · ‖/V , the closure of the convex hull of Φ
(
∆(I), y0
)
and the set Corth(φC) are still δ/V –separated in ‖ · ‖∞–norm, thus are disjoint. Since
the former set is a convex and compact set, and the latter is a closed convex set, the
Hahn–Banach theorem entails that they are strictly separated by some hyperplane. In
particular, one of the two thus-defined half-spaces is not one-shot Φ–approachable.
The above result is a generalization of the polytopial case
In Section 8 we showed that when approaching a polytope, there are only finitely many
directions (i.e., finitely many elements of the sphere S) of interest, namely, the directions
corresponding to the defining hyperplanes. The results we obtained therein can in fact
be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 3 when the latter is stated (and proved) with
a different measure instead of the Lebesgue measure, given by the sums of the Dirac
masses on the directions of the defining hyperplanes.
There are two ways to extend the primal characterization of approachability under
partial monitoring from polytopes to general convex sets. The one we worked out above
relies on the observation that with general convex sets, every direction might be relevant,
as a general convex set is defined as the intersection of infinitely many half-spaces, one per
element of S. Based on this, we introduced for general convex sets a infinite-dimensional
lifting into the space of real-valued mappings on the whole set S. We also resorted the
uniform Lebesgue measure since all directions are equally important.
The other way of generalizing the results relies on the fact that a closed convex set
C ⊆ Rd is approachable if and only if all containing polytopes are approachable. By
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playing in blocks and approximating a given general convex set by a sequence of con-
taining polytopes, one could have shown that C is (r,H)–approachable if and only if
all containing polytopes satisfy the characterization of Corollary 2. However, while this
alternative way leads to a characterization, it is less intrinsic as there is no fixed lifted
space to be considered. (The finite-dimensional lifted spaces depend on the approximat-
ing polytopes.) For the sake of elegance, we thus used the infinite-dimensional lifting
described above.
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Appendix
A brief survey of some well-known properties of support functions
For the sake of self-completeness only we summarize in the lemma below some simple
and well-known properties of support functions.
Lemma 3. We consider a set C ⊆ Rd.
1. If C is bounded in Euclidian norm by C, then φC is bounded in supremum norm by
C and in Euclidean norm by V C, where V is the volume of S under the (induced)
Lebesgue measure.
2. If C is bounded in Euclidian norm by C, then φC is a Lipschitz function, with
Lipschitz constant C.
3. For all C′ ⊆ Rd, if C ⊆ C′, then φC 6 φC′ . The converse implication holds if in
addition C′ is a closed convex set.
4. The function φ is linear, in the sense that for all γ > 0 and all all C′ ⊆ Rd, one
has φγC+C′ = γφC + φC′ .
Proof. Property 1 follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality: for all s ∈ S,∣∣φC(s)∣∣ 6 sup
c∈C
∣∣〈c, s〉∣∣ 6 sup
c∈C
‖c‖ ‖s‖ = sup
c∈C
‖c‖ ,
as the elements s ∈ S have unit norm. The bound in Euclidean norm follows by inte-
gration over S.
For property 2, we note that s ∈ S 7→ 〈c, s〉 is a ‖c‖–Lipschitz function (again, by the
Cauchy–Schwarz inequality). Therefore φC is the supremum of C–Lipschitz functions
and as such is also a C–Lipschitz function.
The first part of property 3 holds by the definition of a supremum. To prove the
converse implication, we use an argument by contradiction. We consider two sets C
and C′, where C′ is closed and convex. We assume that C is not included in C′ and
show that the existence of a s ∈ S such that φC(s) > φC′(s). The set C \ C′ is not
empty, let x be one of its elements. The convex sets {x}, which is compact, and C′,
which is closed, are disjoint sets. The Hahn–Banach theorem ensures the existence of
a strictly separating hyperplane between these convex sets, which we can write in the
form
{
ω ∈ Rd : 〈ω, s〉 = β} for some s ∈ S and β ∈ R such that
φ{x}(s) = 〈x, s〉 > β and ∀c′ ∈ C′, 〈c′, s〉 < β .
This entails that φC′(s) 6 β < φ{x}(s) 6 φC(s).
Finally, the last property is true because by definition
γC + C′ = {γc+ c′ : c ∈ C, c′ ∈ C′}
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and thus, for all s ∈ S,
sup
c′′∈γC+C′
〈c′′, s〉 = sup
c∈C, c′∈C′
γ〈c, s〉+ 〈c′, s〉 = γ sup
c∈C
〈c, s〉+ sup
c′∈C′
〈c′, s〉 ,
where we used the fact that γ > 0 in the last equality.
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